Abstract. In this paper, we consider the expansion of basic modal Gödel logic with the notions of public announcements. Additionally, the public announcement operators are itself fuzzyfied, allowing statements about relations between the truth-value of a formula and rational constant values as well as various combinations of these. Following from this, the problems of the classic style of axiomatization of this new logic are discussed and we investigate the usual reduction-style axioms where we present a work-around for various problems using the Baaz-∆ and respective constants value formulas as extensions for basic Gödel logic. For this we show, that this logic is itself more expressive than our newly introduced one. Finally, we consider the expansion of the fuzzy public announcement logic itself with the notions of the ∆-operator and rational constants, which resolves the before presented problems and from which we can provide the usual proof of completeness by reduction.
Introduction
Uncertainty and vagueness are essential properties in daily reasoning which come intuitively through personal and subjective observations and perceptions. The logical laws underlying these concepts dealing with said properties are therefore undermined with some kind of basic interest for study. One specific approach towards the notions of vagueness started out by the introduction of the notion of a fuzzy set by Lotfi Zadeh generalizing the membership properties of elements from a set. Those considerations then gave life to so called fuzzyfications of many classical aspects of mathematics, including especially the theory of fuzzy logics. In his tremendous monograph [6] , Hájek then introduced a meta-mathematical access to fuzzy logics, connecting their semantics to residuated lattices corresponding to a continuous t-norm. Hájeks basic fuzzy logic BL then corresponds to these logics evaluated over continuous t-norm, while the most prominent examples of t-norm based fuzzy logic are then respectively associated with the three core t-norms, namely the Gödel(or minimum), product and Lukasiewicz t-norm. The case of the Gödel t-norm is especially interesting as it corresponds with initial considerations from Kurt Gödel about the intuitionistic calculus, which where later extensively studied by Dummett. Another important concept of modeling vagueness in logical realms is represented by the families of modal logics, covering the notions of necessity and possibility in many different philosophical interpretations, e.g. modeling temporal factors or epistemic considerations, etc. As introduced by Saul Kripke, the possible world semantics proved itself to be the most prominent and intuitive model theoretic access to modal logics, being formally represented by the so called Kripke-frames and Kripke-models over an associated set of worlds where the elements are called accessible if they are represented by an ordered tuple in a respective accessibility relation. Each world then proposes different valuations for the propositional variables in discourse.
It may seem intuitive to combine those two notions by considering both fuzzy accessiblity relations as well as many-valued interpretations for propositional variables. The subject of modal Gödel logics then arises by considering those fuzzy Kripke-models which evaluate formulas repsectively by the use of the minumum t-norm and the associated algebra. One monumental work covering both a logic enriched with a necessity-style operator and a logic enriched with a possebility-style operator ♦ was developed by Caicedo and Rodriguez in [2] . Modal expansions of the other core t-norm logics where also considered recently, with especially new developments concerning the product t-norm. In her Phd-thesis [8] , Amanda Vidal then proposed a calculus for the logic of all left-continuous t-norms MTL(with certain "good" behavior) enriched with both modal operators as well as rational constants and the Baaz-∆ operator but limited herself to normal accessibility relations. Figure 1 . The axioms for the basic fuzzy-logic BL This fuzzyfication of public announcements provides an even stronger possibility with reasoning not only about public communication but also about public conjectures.
1.1. Preliminaries. Initially, basic propositional Gödel logic G is defined syntactically as the following set of well formed formulas by the BNF
with p ∈ P being an atomic propositions contained in the associated countably-infinite set. Since, in the case of Gödel logic, the strong conjunction & and the weak one ∧ coincide due to the choice of the t-norm, we write ∧ in the general case of the conjunction. The corresponding algebra used for the semantic evaluations is the standard Gödel algebra
with * G being the Gödel(or minimum) t-norm, i.e. x * G y = min{x, y} and ⇒ G being the residuum with x ⇒ G y = 1 for x ≤ y and x ⇒ G y = y otherwise. For our set of propositional variables P(sometimes called V ar) we then define an evaluation function e : P → [0, 1] as the correspondence to the concept of propositional models. Following to this, we naturally extend an evaluation function e to e ′ : L G → [0, 1] 2 which is defined over formulas with a recursive structure by the Tarski-conditions providing the corresponding algebraic operations with
An evaluation e ′ is called a model for φ, iff e ′ (φ) = 1. The other common connectives like ¬, ↔, ∨ are then internally defined over those connectives, i.e. we write ¬φ :
For this algebra together with the proposed conditions for evaluations and models, the notions for semantic consequence are defined similar to the case of normal propositional logic, i.e. for a set of formulas Γ and a formula φ, φ is a semantic consequence of Γ, Γ |= φ, if for all models e ′ with e ′ (ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ, we have that e ′ (φ) = 1.
The calculus for G which we are referring to is based on the reduced version of the calculus of basic fuzzy logic BL(shown in Fig. 1 ) defined by Hájek in [6] , i.e. the version shortened by all axioms later proved redundant(see for example [3] ) in comparison to Hájek original proposal. This BL-calculus gets extended by one specific axiom for axiomatizing Gödel logic, the Gödel axiom (G) : φ → φ ∧ φ. The only rule for the here called calculus G 3 is modus ponens. Throughout this paper, we will refer to a logic via a bold-font version, i.e. L, to a corresponding calculus via a serif-font version L and to the underlying language with L L . The notions for provability in this calculus and throughout this paper are then defined as usual over the use of a chain formulas forming a concrete proof.
For the case of Gödel logic, i.e. the standard Gödel algebra [0, 1] G together with the respective language L G and the proposed calculus G, general strong standard completeness was initially proven by Dummett in [4] . 4 Concerning modal Gödel logic, we mainly refer to the results of Caicedo and Rodriguez in [2] 5 where they 2 One may more explicitly define e ′ with e ′ :
Referring to G = BL + (G). 4 Obviously, the proof by Dummett referred to another calculus and approach different from the later consideration over the concept of basic fuzzy logic which where later proven to be identical to the result by Dummett. 5 The results in this paper we're circulated years before through different preprint versions, see e.g. [1] . Figure 2 . Extensions for the axiomatization of GK-framed models in basic modal Gödel logic introduced a semantic definition for Gödel logic augmented with two modal type operators for general necessity and possibility, namely and ♦. As Gödel logic doesn't provide an involutive negation in its basic terms, these modal operators are not classically interdefinable. In this paper, we will only refer to the necessity(or -) fragment of this language.
Semantically, modal Gödel logics are evaluated over so called Gödel-Kripke models, i.e. Kripke models evaluated over the standard Gödel algebra, M = W, R, e following Definition 2.1 of the before mentioned paper, where W is a non-empty set of worlds or states(sometime referred to as the domain D(M) of the model), R : W × W → [0, 1] is a accessibility function and e : W × P → [0, 1] is the basic evaluation function of the respective model which is evaluated over the standard Gödel algebra for composed formulas. The substructure F = W, R is called a Kripke frame respectively. The corresponding extended version of e gets supplemented by another rule regarding the new modal operator with
Following to the definitions of a multi-world model, we then refer to different notions of satisfiability and validity, namely local validity, i.e. it holds that e ′ (w, φ) = 1, written as (M, w) |= φ, the validness of a formula in certain world of a certain modal; global validity, i.e. it holds that ∀w ∈ W : e ′ (w, φ) = 1, also written as M |= φ, the validness in all worlds of a certain modal.
These concept are easily transferred to a multi-agent context, invoking a non-empty set of agents A. Each of those agents is then associated with an indexed necessity-style operator and an indexed version of its own accessibility function called r a . We then refer to the set of all accessibility functions as R = {r a :
Similar to classical modal logics, we can consider different classes of frames categorized through restrictions on their accessibility relations. These fuzzy versions of the usual systems like e.g. S4 and S5 are then respectively denoted with GS4, GS5, etc. Throughout this paper, we will still only consider the basic class of all multi-agent Gödel-Kripke models, i.e. GK.
This class is then strongly standard complete axiomatized by the extension of the above presented system for Gödel logic with the the axioms and rules presented in Fig. 2 , as proven by the authors of the above paper in Theorem 4.2.
It may also be noted for later considerations that we denote the set of subformulas of a given formula φ with Sub(φ), while it is constructed over the usual decomposition of the formula using the given BNF of the language.
A rational fuzzyfied public announcement operator
Building up on the results in [2] about Gödel modal logic, we're now transferring the idea of public announcement to Gödel logic either, creating a fuzzy analogon to the logic PA. As said before, we will write K a in the case of a necessity-style agent-indexed operator in contrast to a to emphasize the epistemic context. The corresponding set of agents is called A in this context. This new logic, called FPA, is here defined syntactically over the following BNF with
where we have
λ for the term inside the announcement operator [ ] with ψ ∈ L F P A and c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Parentheses are omitted if the context is clear as it was done before. As it can be seen, the usual public announcement operator got fuzzyfied by publicly announcing rational relations between a certain formula ψ and a value constant c. These core value-formulas can be combined using the usual connectives to create a formulas making a fuzzy restriction on the models. This whole set of well-formed value-formulas is labeled with L F P AV .
The semantics of this new logic are again defined over the relational Kripkean semantics of fuzzy modal Gödel logic, i.e. we're using the same frame/model definitions as provided in the preliminaries, again defined over an augmented Gödel algebra for the evaluation of composed formulas in a specific world. Therefore, the extended evaluation function e ′ gets supplemented by another rule for composed formulas which provides handling for the new operator with
where M is an arbitrary model and w ∈ D(M). The model M|λ and the corresponding extended evaluation function mentioned in the before definition derives from the original restricted model idea of basic PA by the following Def. 1.
is defined with
where
We again augment the rules for the extension e ′ with the following two rules to handle the core value-formulas as enforced by the definitions of the restrictions for the set of worlds W λ in Def. 1.
From these definitions, the core valuation-formulas and by that all composite versions λ being possible for the announcement operators are possible to get evaluated in a certain world, making it also possible to create the restricted set of worlds according to the definition. Note, that the core value-formulas and therefore all possible compositions only take discrete boolean values. For the other common relations between the real values in the discourse like ≥ etc., we use the following abbreviations:
After these considerations for the basic semantics of FPA, we find, that the usual reduction axioms seem to be valid in the fuzzy realm as well, as it follows from Prop. 1. The problem with these valid sentences is that not all 6 are well-formed with respect to the conditions made for FPA before in the corresponding BNFs.
7
We still pseudo-assign a truth value for these sentences, to show that they should be valid in a more metaperceptional sense. This is only possible, since, although they are not well-formed, they don't provide some mere syntactical error but instead use the value-formulas in an unintended sense, still following the other rules made for well-formedness.
Proposition 1.
The following sentences appear to be valid in all FPA-models over GK-frames:
Proof. Since all value-formulas either evaluate to 0 or 1, we split the proof into two parts, (a) considering e ′ (w, λ) = 1 and (b) considering e ′ (w, λ) = 0 for an arbitrary world w in an arbitrary model M. If e ′ is not subscripted, it is assumed that it referrers to this original model. Obviously, the whole proof is carried out in a hypothetical sense. Considering the righthand side, we also derive e ′ (w, λ → p) = 1 as for every value e ′ (w, p), we have 0 ≤ e ′ (w, p). 6 More specific: (i), (ii) and (v). 7 Which is why it is referred to them as sentences, not formulas. 
. By the definition of the modal necessity operator presented before, we write inf 
(vi): For this formula, it suffices to show that the two restricted models M|(λ ∧ [λ]µ) and (M|λ)|µ are isomorphic to each other. As both, the restricted version of e and R only depend on the restricted set W ′ , we simply show that W is similar for both restricted models. Therefore, suppose that w ∈ D(M|λ ∧ [λ]µ). Thus e ′ (w, λ ∧ [λ]µ) = 1, i.e. e ′ (w, λ) = 1 and e ′ (w, [λ]µ) = 1 by the semantics of ∧. From the first one, we infer w ∈ D(M|λ) while we derive e ′ M|λ (w, µ) = 1 from both of them together. From these two statements, we infer w ∈ D((M|λ)|µ). The fact that w was arbitrary completes the proof.
Apparently, the typical reduction formulas (at least should) maintain their truth in this new context but since not all of them follow the proposed definitions for well-formed formulas we're not able to provide a classical, reduction style axiomatic system. For avoiding these syntactical errors, we propose a second approach to these concepts by incorporating the Baaz-Monteiro operator ∆ as well as rational constants. It will then be shown that it is possible to create adequate translations for the valuation formulas using these notions.
Similar expressions for value formulas using the Delta-operator and constants
In this section, we provide the groundwork on the before presented idea of expressing the valuation formulas through augmentation of the core language by the ∆-operator as well as with rational constants. The here introduced logic K ∆ (Q) is then later proved to be even more expressive than our logic FPA. extending the Tarski-conditions for our logic with e ′ (∆φ) = δ(e ′ (φ)). This additionally yields the standard G ∆ -algebra by augmenting the standard G-algebra with the truth function δ for the additional operator.
Additionally we're considering the enrichment of this ∆-Gödel logic with the notions of truth-constants for each rational c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Following the results and definitions in [5] , we consider the rational subalgebra of [0, 1] G (in the following simply denoted by Q) as the corresponding algebraic notion for the new formulas. We denote this new logic with G ∆ (Q). Now, considering the language, we simply introduce a constant value formulac for each c ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1). 8 Obviously, for the extended evaluation function, we simply consider the augmentation with the rule e ′ (c) = c in correspondence with the algebraic counterpart following Definition 4.2 8 The constants0 and1 are excluded from this linguistic considerations as they are associated with the formulas ⊥ and ⊤ respectively.
of [5] . 9 For the corresponding axiomatic system G ∆ (Q), we consider the axiomatic extension of G with the following axioms
together with the ∆-necessitation rule (∆ − N ec) : From φ, infer ∆φ. As shown in Corollary 8.9 from [5] , the logic G ∆ (Q) together with the calculus G ∆ (Q) also enjoys the strong standard completeness with respect to the algebraic counterpart as a combination of the standard G ∆ -algebra and the algebra for G(Q).
3.2.
Augmentation by the modal K-operator. The logic G ∆ (Q) presented before gets now additionally extended with the modal necessity operator K a . We call this new logic K ∆ (Q), which language is defined over the following BNF.
The semantics of this logic are again defined similar as before by the frame/model definitions given for the basic K a -logic, while the models are now obviously defined over the Gödel-algebra extended with the notions of the ∆-operator and the constant value formulasc for their contained extended evaluation function.
Although it is not in the scope of this paper, there are still some conjectures to make about the axiomatic system for K ∆ (Q) as it may consist about the before presented axioms and rules for the sole ∆-operator and constants together with additional axioms for interplay with the K a -operator. For this, we may use axioms proposed in [8] for the calculus of left-continuous t-norms accepting a conjunctive axiomatization over crisp frames like
which appear to be valid in the many-valued frame context either.
In the logic K ∆ (Q), it is now possible to provide corresponding formulas to the before presented core valuationformulas over the following proposition. , we derive e ′ (w, V (ψ) = c) = 0. Now considering the corresponding formula using constants and the ∆-operator, we have e ′ (w, ψ ↔c) = 1 iff e ′ (w, ψ) = e ′ (c), i.e. if (a) is presumed, and e ′ (w, ψ ↔c) < 1 otherwise per the definition of the semantics of ↔. From this, we have e ′ (w, ∆(ψ ↔c)) = 1 iff e ′ (w, ψ) = e ′ (w,c), i.e. e ′ (w, ψ) = c, and e ′ (w, ∆(ψ ↔c)) = 0 otherwise per definition of ∆.
(ii): Presuming (a), we obviously have e ′ (w, V (ψ) > c) = 1 per definition and again presuming (b), i.e. e ′ (w, ψ) ≤ c, we have e ′ (w, V (ψ) > c) = 0. Now considering the semantics of → through the corresponding function ⇒ G , we have e ′ (w, ψ →c) = 1 only if e ′ (w, ψ) ≤ c and e ′ (w, ψ →c) < 1 otherwise. Using the ∆-operator, we derive that e ′ (w, ∆(ψ →c)) = 1 only if e ′ (w, ψ) ≤ c and e ′ (w, ∆(ψ →c)) = 0 iff e ′ (w, ψ) > c. Using ¬, we provide an exchange of premises.
Taking these translations for the core valuation formulas, we now consider the following complete translation, providing the main part of the proof of one of the main theorems of this paper. Theorem 1. K ∆ (Q) is more expressive than FPA.
9 As this is not in the direct scope of this paper, we will not dive too hard into the algebraic notions.
Proof. The proof is established over a translation system with a function t : L F P A ∪ L F P AV → L K∆(Q) by the following recursive definition.
Eventually eliminating all announcements, we find for each
is not less expressive than FPA. Since this translation can not be established for the inverse direction as there is no direct representative for the formulas created by the ∆-operator and the constants outside of the announcement operators, we find that FPA is not equally expressive to K ∆ (Q) either. The validness of these translations was established before trough Prop. 1 together with Prop. 2.
4. Expanding FPA with the ∆-operator and constants
Although it was not possible to provide a reduction-style axiomatic system for the simple version of our new logic FPA, we still showed that basic Gödel logic extended with the ∆-operator and rational constants can express these statements and even that it is expressively stronger. This immediately leads to considering FPA enriched with the notion of constants and the Baaz-operator as the classical reduction axioms would be expressible as well formed formulas. We define the language of FPA ∆ (Q) over the following BNF
where we have an equal styled definition for λ-formulas, adding the new introduced operator.
10 Additionally, we don't allow plain constants outside of the valuation formulas similar to the basic propositional variables.
By now considering the before provided preliminaries and notions for the different components, this leads to the following proposition. [
Proof. The proof of the first six formulas is similar to the (pseudo-)proof of Prop. 1. We now consider the two additional ones regarding the ∆ operator and constants. We assume the same presumptions as in the before referenced proposition. The case regarding e ′ (w, λ) = 0 is left out since it should be obvious.
Suppose that e ′ (w, λ) = 1, therefore we have e ′ (w, [λ]∆φ) = e ′ λ (w, ∆φ). By the definition of ∆, this translates to δ(e ′ λ (w, φ)). Considering the righthand side, we first derive
. By the definition of ∆ again, we have that δ(e ′ (w, [λ]φ)). Since we presumed that e ′ (w, λ) = 1, we then have
Now considering the second equivalency, we again presume that e ′ (w, λ) = 1. Thus, we have e ′ (w, [λ]c) = e ′ λ (w,c) = r. Now, for the righthand side, we get e ′ (w, λ →c) = e ′ (w,c) = r.
Using the equivalences of the section before, we can now provide the well-formedness trough the adequate translation of the atomic value-formulas into their above presented correspondings to which they only serve as labels anymore. Additionally, we still had to introduce two reduction axioms for the newly introduced parts of the language. From these reductions, we now provide a proof system for our logic FPA ∆ (Q) shown in Proof. This lemma follows directly from Prop. 3 establishing the validity of all the remaining axioms not contained in the subsystem K ∆ (Q). As all K ∆ (Q)-models are captured in FPA ∆ (Q)-models as well, we find that the subsystem K ∆ (Q) is sound with respect to all FPA ∆ (Q)-models either.
4.1.
Completeness by reduction. For now proving completeness for the logic FPA ∆ (Q), we consider a similar translation as used in the proof of Thm. 1 extended by the notions for the ∆-operator and our rational constants.
11 is defined recursively as follows:
Note, that the translations for the atomic value-formulas are no longer needed as they now only serve as abbreviations anymore. Following the usual process of proving completeness by reduction, we now first establish a complexity measure suitable for providing the necessary properties for some later propositions.
Definition 3. The complexity measure c : L F P A∆(Q) → N is defined over the following inductive rules:
Following the proof concept presented in e.g. [7] , this complexity measure now provides some useful properties needed for the last steps in advancing the completeness theorem.
We're now following the usual fashion and now provide the lemma establishing the provable equivalency for a formula and its translation.
Proof. By establishing an induction over the complexity measure, it can be easily shown that for every finite complexity of a formula, its translation is provable as it relates to the properties of a typical subformula, using Lem. 2 and Prop. 3.
From this lemma, we're now able to provide the completeness theorem for our extended versions of FPA through the reduction axioms. Additionally, by induction on the complexity of a formula, it may be shown that for each φ ∈ L F P A∆(Q) , we have t(φ) ∈ L K∆(Q) .
Theorem 2 (Completeness).
The system FPA ∆ (Q) is strong standard complete with respect to all GK-framed FPA ∆ (Q)-models, assuming a strong standard complete axiomatization for K ∆ (Q) called K ∆ (Q).
Proof. Taking an arbitrary theory Γ and an arbitrary formula φ, suppose that Γ |= φ(with respect to the before mentioned model class). Since ⊢ F P A∆(Q) φ ↔ t(φ) and the soundness of the system established in Lem. 1, we find that Γ |= t(φ). Now, the formula t(φ) doesn't contain any public announcement operators, i.e. t(φ) ∈ L K∆(Q) . Therefore, we have that Γ ⊢ K∆(Q) t(φ). Since K ∆ (Q) is a subsystem of FPA ∆ (Q), we additionally find that Γ ⊢ F P A∆(Q) t(φ). Now again from ⊢ F P A∆(Q) φ ↔ t(φ), it follows that Γ ⊢ F P A∆(Q) φ. Corollary 1. FPA ∆ (Q) is equally expressive as K ∆ (Q).
Remark 1. The corollary follows not solely from the completeness theorem but from the proof including the before presented lemmas and definitions of the translation.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the notions of fuzzy public announcement operators evaluated over the standard Gödel-algebra. These fuzzy relations inside the announcements could then relate a formula and its truth degree in the respective worlds to a rational constant. For this new provided logic FPA, we then considered expressivity comparisions with the augmented Gödel logic K ∆ (Q), i.e. the logic extending basic Gödel logic with the notions of the Baaz-Delta, rational constants and a necessity-style modal operator K a for a set of agents A. It was then shown that this augmented Gödel logic is itself more expressive than FPA. The choice for rational constants was here made for easy axiomatization of this corresponding logic using constants as it doesn't require the language to be uncoutable. The introduction of real constants for the open unit interval is left for future work, as together with the uncountability there may be other additional issues occuring. The logic FPA itself is left unaxiomatized for future work following the presented problems regarding the somewhat standard process of reduction-styled axioms. Since an augmentation with the ∆-operator and truth constants of FPA itself resolves the issues around the typical reduction axioms, we then provided a strong completeness theorem for this logic over the reduction to the before shown corresponding logic K ∆ (Q), assuming a still to-provide axiomatization for K ∆ (Q).
